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Introduction
To what extent do corporate bond yield spreads reflect default risk? How is the nondefault component of yield spreads, if it exists, associated with bond liquidity? These are fundamental issues to understanding how financial markets value corporate bonds and thus important for corporate financing, risk management, and monetary policy (Kohn, 2007) . Early studies compared observed yield spreads to the spreads implied by bond pricing models calibrated using historical data on corporate bond defaults (e.g., Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld, 1984; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Duffie and Singleton, 1997; Duffee, 1999; Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann, 2001; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin, 2001; Delianedis and Geske, 2001; Huang and Huang, 2003; Eom, Helwege and Huang, 2004) . Their results are mixed. For example, Elton et al. (2001) suggested that, when taking into account both expected credit loss and associated risk premiums, most of yield spreads are attributable to default risk. In contrast, Huang and Huang (2003) suggested that the nondefault component accounts for the majority of yield spreads, especially so for high-rated investment-grade bonds. These conflicting results may be due largely to data limitations and model sensitivity in estimating the default component (Delianedis and Geske, 2001; Huang and Huang, 2003; Eom et al., 2004) .
To address these issues, recent studies examine the determinants of corporate bond yield spreads using data on credit default swap (CDS) spreads (e.g., Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 2005; Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam, 2006; Ericsson, Reneby and Wang, 2007) . They generally find that the majority of corporate yield spreads are due to default risk. To understand the advantage of using CDS data, a brief description of CDS is useful. A CDS is an insurance contract on credit risk, where a protection seller promises to buy the reference bond at its par value when a pre-defined credit event occurs. In return, a protection buyer makes periodic payments to the seller until the maturity date of the contract or until a credit event occurs. This periodic payment, usually expressed as a percentage of the notional value of protection, is called the "CDS spread". Since default risk is traded through CDS separately from other factors that may affect bond price, such as embedded options, the CDS spread allows for a reasonable estimate for the default component of yield spread without explicitly estimating expected credit loss and associated risk premium.
In this paper we also use CDS spreads to estimate the default component of corporate bond yield spreads and examine the link between the nondefault component and liquidity. Our main contribution to the literature is our use of intraday transactions data to measure bond liquidity. Previous studies suggested that liquidity may manifest through the price impact of trades or market depth (e.g., Kyle, 1985) , transaction costs (e.g., Acharya and Pedersen, 2005) , or trading frequency (e.g., Vayanos, 1998; and Lo, Mamaysky and Wang, 2004) . We explore a number of measures to capture each of these aspects of In our regression analysis, we link the nondefault component to our liquidity measures constructed from intraday transactions data. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the nondefault component of yield spreads and illiquidity for investment-grade bonds (i.e., those rated AA, A, and BBB) but no significant relationship for speculative-grade bonds. This result contrasts to Chen et al. (2007) who suggested the liquidity effects are stronger for speculative-grade bonds. 3 Our point estimates suggest that relative to total yield spreads, the liquidity effects decrease in rating -the strongest for AArated bonds and the weakest for BBB-rated bonds. Specifically, when one of our liquidity measures deteriorates by the magnitude of its interquartile range, the increase in the nondefault component can be as high as 6 percent of total yield spreads for AA-rated bonds, 4 percent for A-rated bonds, and 3 percent for BBB-rated bonds. While previous studies such as Longstaff et al. (2005) and Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2006) also suggested the nondefault component is positively related to illiquidity, they generally did not distinguish the liquidity effects by rating groups. 4 We also find that the nondefault component of bond spreads comoves with indicators for macroeconomic conditions, particularly, negatively with the Treasury term structure. This result is consistent with previous studies suggesting that corporate yield spreads are associated with marketwide factors (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Duffie and Singleton, 1997; Delianedis and Geske, 2001; Liu, Longstaff and Mandell, 2006; Longstaff, 2004; Das and Hanouna, 2009 ). In addition, controlling for conventional liquidity proxies affects little the statistical significance of our transaction-based liquidity measures, suggesting our measures identify a unique part of the variation in the nondefault component of yield spreads. Finally, the estimated effects of our transaction-based liquidity measures are largely robust to a number of alternative model specifications and data samplings, such as restricting to firms included in the CDX indexes, excluding possibly news-driven trades, and using Treasury rate as the risk free rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes data sources and sampling schemes; Section 3 describes definitions and summary statistics of our transaction-based liquidity measures;
Section 4 presents our methodology estimating the nondefault component of yield spreads and examines its cross-sectional and time-series properties; Section 5 reports our regression results on the effects of liquidity on the nondefault component; and Section 6 concludes.
3 Chen et al. (2007) found that the effects of their liquidity measures on speculative-grade yield spreads are larger than those on investment-grade bonds. Because their studies did not explicitly decompose yield spreads into the default and nondefault components, the liquidity interpretation is complicated by the possible positive correlation between credit risk and illiquidity (Alexander et al., 2004; Schultz, 2001; Ericsson and Renault, 2006) . The same critique applies to other studies on the relation between yield spreads and illiquidity (e.g., Fisher, 1959; Perraudin and Taylor, 2003; . sample." Throughout this paper, we conduct our analysis at the monthly frequency, where, unless noted otherwise, the monthly value of a time-varying variable is the average of its corresponding daily values.
The rest of this section provides details on our data and sampling method.
The Overall Sample
The data on daily bond yields are from Merrill Lynch's Corporate Bond Index Database ("the ML Database"). 5 The ML Database also contains information on some bond characteristics, including the amount of face value outstanding and a composite rating based on S&P and Moody's ratings. Additional bond descriptive information is obtained from both Bloomberg and Moody's DRS databases. 6 We retain only senior unsecured U.S. dollar-denominated bonds issued by U.S. firms that pay fixed semi-annual or zero coupons with remaining maturity less than 15 years. We also delete bonds that are callable, puttable, convertible, or have sinking fund features.
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We use issuer ticker to merge the bond yield data with the CDS spread data provided by Markit Partners.
Issuer tickers are manually checked and adjusted to ensure the merge accuracy. The Markit's data contain daily composite spread quotes on CDS contracts with maturities at 6 month, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, and 30 years. 8 Following the common practice, we use quotes corresponding to the modified restructuring clause for U.S. dollar-denominated notional values. In addition, a reference entity is included on any day 5
The yields are based on bid-side price quotes the close of business days. The main advantage of the ML Database is that it allows us to analyze the determinants of yield spreads back to 2001. In contrast, the comprehensive public dissemination of the TRACE transaction data started only in late 2004. The composition of the ML Database is rebalanced at the end of every month, at only which point may the Merrill's composite bond ratings change. Moody's DRS database contains comprehensive information on the characteristics of corporate bonds ever rated by Moody's, including bond seniority, security, coupon frequency, issue date, and currency denomination. The database, though, has less information on option features written in the bond contracts, with which we use information searched on Bloomberg to complement.
More than half of the bonds in the ML Database are callable. Thus including those bonds would have increased our sample significantly. For bonds with option features, Merrill provides estimates of option-adjusted yields, or "effective yields". Using these effective yields and callability as an additional control variable, we repeated the analysis reported in this paper and obtained similar conclusions.
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These composite quotes represent the average of the midpoint of bid and ask quotes from a number of major dealers. Markit calculates daily values only for contracts that have quotes from at least three different contributors after they filter out outliers, stale quotes, and flat curves. only if its CDS quotes are non-missing at 1-and 10-year and at additional two or more of the four maturities in between.
As shown in Panel A of Table 1 (memo item), the overall sample consists of 1263 unique bonds from 328 firms (identified by unique issuer ticker), with on average nearly 4 bonds per firm. The numbers of bonds and firms vary significantly by bond rating. Slightly over three quarters of the sample are investmentgrade bonds. Also, in term of number of bonds, A-and BBB-rated bonds are by far the most available;
AA-and BB-rated bonds come next; and bonds in both tails of the rating distribution (i.e., AAA and CCC/below) are the fewest. In addition, excluding the tails of the rating distribution, the average number of bonds per firm increases with better rating, from slightly over 2 for B-rated bonds to about 10 for AArated bonds.
The Regression Sample
We use intraday transactions data provided by NASD's TRACE to compute measures for corporate bond liquidity. TRACE started to disseminate to the public intraday transactions data on July 1, 2002 for a small number of selected corporate bonds; but the dissemination expanded gradually and began to cover most of the corporate bonds traded over the counter on October 1, 2004 (see Appendix 1 for more details and the limitations of the TRACE data). The data contain trading information such as transaction price, trading size, settlement date and time. Following the practice in the existing studies using the TRACE data, we remove observations with "data errors" (e.g., Edwards, Harris and Piwowar, 2007).
9
We first estimate daily liquidity measures and then compute their monthly average values, which in turn are merged with our overall sample using bond CUSIPs. The resultant "regression sample" is significantly smaller than the overall sample due mainly to the limited coverage of TRACE data before the full dissemination phase. As shown in Panel B of Table 1 (memo item), the regression sample consists of 808 unique bonds from 242 firms, with on average slightly over 3 bonds per firm. Even so, the distribution of the number of bonds by rating is similar to that in the overall sample. First, about 80 percent of the regression sample are investment-grade bonds. Second, most of investment-grade bonds are A-or BBBrated, and most of speculative-grade bonds are BB-rated. Third, excluding the tails of rating categories, the average number of bonds per firm increases with better rating, from close to 2 for B-rated bonds to about 7 for AA-rated bonds.
Specifically, we delete a trade if any one of the following conditions is met: trade size is missing or zero; price is less than $1 or greater than $500; price is more than 20 percent away from median price in a day; or price is more than 20 percent away from previous trading price. 
Data on Risk Free Rates and Macroeconomic Variables
Our analysis focuses on the results with swap rate as the risk free rate. It is now widely believed that swap rate is closer to the risk free rate benchmark used by market participants in pricing corporate debt and its derivatives, in part because swaps face similar tax and regulatory treatments as corporate credits do (see, e.g., Hull et al., 2004; Longstaff et al., 2005; Blanco, Brennan and March, 2005; Zhu, 2006) . In contrast, although Treasury securities are almost truly default free, Treasury yields may be affected by other factors, such as the specialness of Treasury securities and tax benefits.
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Nonetheless, we also contrast our main results with those using Treasury yields as the risk free rate, not only because some existing studies used Treasury yields but also because swap rate is not completely risk free due to the counterparty credit risk in the swap contract and the credit risk in the LIBOR rate.
We use the following conventional variables to measure macroeconomic conditions: the level and the slope of Treasury term structure, the return and implied volatilities on the S&P 500 index, and Treasury 10-year on-the-run premiums. These variables are collected from Bloomberg and the Federal Reserve Board.
Measuring Corporate Bond Liquidity Using Intraday Transactions Data
Using intraday transactions data for corporate bonds reported in TRACE, we compute one measure for each of the following three types of bond liquidity definitions: price impact of trades, transaction cost, and trading frequency. 11 Considering these multiple measures is important because different aspects of the liquidity concept may manifest in different fashion in the intraday trading statistics. We also discuss bond characteristics that are used in the literature as proxies for bond liquidity, and examine their relationship with our trading-based liquidity measures. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for these liquidity measures.
Amihud Measure as Price Impact of Trades
Bond liquidity may manifest through the price impact of trades or market depth (Kyle, 1985) . We adopt one of the most frequently-used price impact measures, proposed by Amihud (2002) , by defining the 10 For example, lower capital requirements for financial institutions to hold Treasury securities, hence higher demand for holding Treasury securities to fulfill regulatory requirements, may give additional values (convenience yield) to Treasuries beyond a pure risk-free instrument (Duffee, 1996; Reinhart and Sack, 2001 ). In addition, interests earned on Treasury securities are not taxed at the state level, but those on corporate bonds are.
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We also consider alternative measures for these definitions, such as modified Amihud measure, price dispersion, and average number of trades. The Amihud measure indicates illiquidity in that a larger value implies that a trade of a given size would move the price more, suggesting the bond is more illiquid. By construction, daily Amihud measures are nonmissing for only bonds traded at least twice on the day.
As shown on Line 1 of Table 2 , for all rating categories together, the median Amihud measure is 0.34, suggesting that a median trade, at about $30,000 (Line 10), would move price by roughly 1 percent. By rating, the median Amihud measure is the highest for speculative-grade bonds, at 0.42, which is only modestly higher than those for other rating categories, all at about 0.32.
Estimated Bid-Ask Spread as Transaction Cost
Liquidity is also often defined by transaction costs (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005) . A commonly-used measure for transaction costs is bid-ask spread. Unfortunately, our data do not have information on bid-ask quotes or on the side initiating a trade -which potentially could be used to trace out effective bid-ask spreads. Instead, we estimate bid-ask spreads using the well-known Roll (1984) One key assumption is that the market is informationally efficient. That is, public information is instantaneously reflected in asset prices. The market microstructure literature has shown that the existence of asymmetric information and the associated risk of adverse selection affect the effective bid-ask spreads. To partly mitigate this issue, we conduct experiments in our robustness analysis by excluding trades that likely occur during major news hours. The intuition of the Roll model is the following. Assuming informational efficiency and no news on a bond's fundamental values, bond prices should bounce up and down within the band formed by bid-ask quotes, generating a negative correlation between price changes in adjacent trades. The extent of this negative correlation depends on the the width of the band. By construction, daily bid-ask spread estimates are nonmissing for only bonds traded at least three times on the day.
As shown on Line 2 of Table 2 , for all rating categories together, the median estimated bid-ask spread is 0.91 percent of price, rather costly comparing to trading stocks and Treasury securities (Chakravarty and Sarkar, 2003; Fleming, 2003; Hasbrouck, 2005) . By rating, the median estimated bid-ask spreads increase with worse ratings, with the lowest at 0.8 percent of price for AA-rated bonds and the highest at 1.3 percent of price for speculative-grade bonds.
Turnover Rate as a Measure of Trading Frequency
Bond liquidity may also be reflected in trading frequency. Intuitively, all else equal, bonds that are more illiquid would trade less frequently. Trading frequency measures have been widely used as indicators for asset liquidity (see, e.g., Vayanos, 1998; Lo et al., 2004; and Chen et al., 2007) . We consider monthly turnover rate as our trading frequency measure, which is the ratio of total trading volume in a month to the amount of face value outstanding. By construction, turnover rate statistics are nonmissing for all bonds in our sample.
As shown on Line 3 of Table 2 , for all rating categories together, the median monthly turnover rate is merely 0.04, meaning that for the average bond in our sample, it takes about 25 months to turn over once.
That corporate bonds are traded sparsely is also evident by other measures: the median number of traded days, Line 8, is 15 days, the median number of trades in a month, Line 9, is 44, and the median monthly trading volume, Line 11, is about $15 million.
There is no apparent difference by rating in the median turnover rate. While better-rated bonds tend to have higher median numbers of trades or traded days in a month, they are also generally larger in face values outstanding. For example, the median number of trades for AA-rated bonds is 100 times a month, notably larger than 35 times a month for speculative-grade bonds (Line 9); but the median size of AArated bonds is $800 million, also notably larger than just under $300 million for speculative-grade bonds (Line 7). bonds to only -8 percent for AA-rated bonds. The correlations between the bid-ask spread and turnover rate also vary widely, ranging from -4 percent for A-rated bonds to 8 percent for speculative-grade bonds.
The large variation in the correlations among these liquidity measures may reflect the multifaceted nature of the liquidity concept, suggesting that each of these measures may have captured only some aspects of bond liquidity. Thus, it would be helpful to combine these measures in our analysis to exploit their potential complimentary features.
Bond Characteristics as Proxies for Liquidity
Lacking of intraday transactions data, previous studies often use bond characteristics as proxies for bond liquidity, such as coupon rate, bond age, remaining maturity, and bond size. To save space, we don't recite the various hypotheses that are proposed in the literature on why these proxies may be reasonable.
See, for example, Longstaff et al. (2005) for a reference.
Average bond characteristics are shown on Lines 4 to 7 of Table 2 . For the entire regression sample, the median bond in a typical month has a coupon rate of 6.4 percent, is close to 4 years since issuance, has slightly over 4 years of remaining maturity, and has $400 million dollars outstanding. Not surprisingly, the median coupon rate increases with worse bond rating. In addition, speculative-grade bonds tend to be smaller and notably older in our sample, but the remaining maturity is the longest for BBB-rated bonds and the shortest for A-rated bonds .
Relationship between Liquidity Measures and Bond Characteristics
As argued earlier, bond characteristics used as proxies for liquidity are either constant or deterministic. and Hotchkiss and Jostova (2007) . 13 In addition, we include firm and time fixed-effects to account for unobservable firm heterogeneity and macroeconomic effects.
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We have also conducted experiments with dummy variables indicating each year (up to 15) of bond age and remaining maturity and experiments with dummy variables indicating brackets of bond age and remaining maturity using conventional cutoff points at 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. The results are similar to what we report here.
Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research Working Paper No.02/2011
Table 4 presents the regression results. Note that our results on the Amihud and bid-ask spread measures are new to the literature and that those on the turnover rate measure are in general consistent with the evidence in the existing literature (Alexander et al., 2004; Hotchkiss and Ronen, 2002; Edwards et al., 2007; Downing et al., 2005) . The following findings are worth mentioning. First, our transactionbased liquidity measures are weakly related to bond characteristics, especially for lower rated bonds.
Specifically, Third, as for bond age and remaining maturity, the coefficients on their polynomials are jointly statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in all specifications. In general, the point estimates suggest that bonds that are older or have longer remaining maturities are more illiquid.
The Nondefault Component of Yield Spreads
In this section, we first describe our method of using the CDS term-structure to estimate the nondefault component of corporate bond yield spreads. We then examine the properties of the estimated nondefault component in both cross section and time series.
Estimation Method
The key issue of estimating the nondefault component of corporate bond yield spreads is to estimate appropriately the default component. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to estimating the default component: one based on corporate bond pricing models, and the other based on CDS spreads.
Typically, the former approach first calibrates a corporate bond pricing model to match historical data on corporate bond default frequency and loss given default, then uses the yield spread implied by the model as the estimate for the default component of the observed yield spread (e.g., Huang and Huang, 2003) .
This approach has two main drawbacks: one, the estimates are sensitive to the model assumptions on both default process and risk premium (Delianedis and Geske, 2001; Huang and Huang, 2003; Eom et al., 2004) ; two, it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate expected credit loss on individual bonds with reasonable precision. Estimations using aggregate default data ignore completely the heterogeneous risk profiles among different bonds, and they may have significant statistical errors because historical default events are sparse and clustered in a small number of recession periods.
The CDS-based approach avoids these potential problems because CDS spreads reflect market expectations on both default probability and loss given default and the associated risk premiums. As shown in Duffie (1999), under certain conditions, CDS spreads are equal to the yield spread on a bond with the same credit risk exposure. Due to data limitations, most existing studies use only 5-year CDS spread data (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005; Blanco, Brennan and March, 2005; Zhu, 2006; Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam, 2006; and Ericsson et al., 2007) . Of course, it is rare for a reference entity to have a bond maturing in exact 5 years on any given day. As a result, researchers rely on pricing information on the bonds straddling the 5-year maturity to estimate the yield spread on a hypothetical bond at the 5-year maturity. This may induce an estimation error because the reference entity might have issued a 5-year bond with different terms and the price on the 5-year hypothetical bond might have been different if it were actually traded. In addition, it is hard to fully address the coupon effect in bond yield computations, partly because the cash flow of the hypothetical bond is not well defined. Also, because there are no observable data on the hypothetical bond for either liquidity proxies or transactions data, statistical analysis on the liquidity effect has to be done using the bonds in the bracket.
We also use CDS data to estimate the default component of yield spreads, and our approach avoids constructing any hypothetical bonds and addresses the issues of both maturity mismatch and coupon effect. Our estimation has three steps. First, for each firm on each day, we estimate a CDS-implied par yield curve by adding swap rates to CDS spreads at observed maturity points and interpolating across maturities using the piecewise cubic Hermite interpolating polynomial (PCHIP) algorithm. 14 Under certain conditions laid out in Duffie (1999) and assuming swap rate is the appropriate measure of risk free rate, the resulting curve equals the par yield curve for floating-rate bonds with the same credit profile as the reference entity. Duffie and Liu (2001) further show that par yields on floating-rate and fixed-rate bonds by the same issuer would differ only a bit for the usual range of interest rate term structures and term to maturities (see also Longstaff et al., 2005; . Thus, we use the resulting curve as a reasonable approximation for the par-yield curve for fixed-rate bonds with the same credit profiles.
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Second, from a firm's CDS-implied par yield curve, we compute zero yield curve and discount rate curve using the standard bootstrap method. Finally, we use the estimated discount rate curve to discount the cash flow of each bond and obtain an estimate of the bond price implied by the firm's CDS term structure.
We call the yield computed from the resulting bond price "the CDS-implied yield". The default component of bond yield spread is simply the CDS-implied yield minus the risk free rate, and the nondefault component is bond yield spread minus the default component.
14 Both swap and Treasury rates are par yields estimated by the Board staff using the methodology outlined in Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2006) . The PCHIP algorithm, available in Matlab, differs from a regular spline method in that it preserves the shape of the data and respects monotonicity. That is, on intervals where the data are monotonic, so is the interpolated curve; at points where the data have a local extremum, so does the interpolated curve. Therefore, PCHIP does not introduce artificial oscillations p between points, which a regular spline algorithm may often do.
15 Longstaff et al. (2005) used a reduced-form CDS pricing model to reduce the approximation errors, and they echo Duffie and Liu (2001) that such errors may be small. Moreover, such model-based correction may not be desirable as the estimation errors may be sensitive to the specifications of CDS pricing models (see e.g., Ericsson et al., 2007; and Huang and Zhou, 2007) .
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It is important to note the actual bond yield and the CDS-implied yield have identical cash flows. Thus, we remove both maturity mismatch and coupon effect in calculating both default and nondefault components of yield spread. Moreover, our approach implies that on any given period when a firm has multiple bonds meeting our sampling criteria, they are all kept in our sample. As discussed in details below, these extra degrees of freedom allow us to apply a fixed-effects approach to control for the unobservable firm heterogeneity, which effectively identifies the liquidity effect using variation across bonds by the same issuer.
Similar to our approach, Levin, Perli and Zakrajsek (2007) also utilize the full term structure of CDS spreads to estimate default component of bond yield spreads. However, while they match maturity for existing bonds, they fail to address the coupon effect issue, because they read the default component directly from the CDS term structure without taking into individual bond's cash flow. Also, our estimation of nondefault component resembles the (negative) CDS-cash bond basis in existing studies (e.g., De Wit, 2006; and Calamaro, Alam, Thakkar and Crnja, 2008) , with the small difference reflecting our desire to follow closely the existing academic literature on the liquidity effect on bond yield spreads.
Cross-Sectional Characteristics
We examine the cross-sectional characteristics of the components of yield spreads for a sample of bonds with relatively stable risk profile during the period. Specifically, we remove bonds whose ratings ever changed by one or more whole rating letter and bonds that appear in less than three months over the period. 16 For each bond, we then compute its average yield spread and average default and nondefault components over the entire period. This results in a pure cross-sectional sample, consisting of 743 investment-grade bonds and 111 speculative-grade bonds. Table 5 reports by bond rating the average values of yield spread and its components. Column (1) shows the average spread of bond yield over comparable-maturity swap rate. Columns (2) and (3) show, respectively, the default and nondefault components of the spread. Column (4) calculates the nondefault component as a fraction of yield spreads. Several patterns emerge from the table. First, not surprisingly, both yield spread and the default component increase with worse rating, from under 10 basis points for AAA-rated bonds to over 10 percent for CC-rated bonds. Second, the nondefault component, both in basis points and as a fraction of yield spreads, is statistically significantly different from zero for all but AAA-rated investment-grade bonds, with their sizes increasing with worse rating. In term of economic magnitude, the nondefault component is moderate in general, ranging 3 basis points, or 13 percent of yield spreads, for AA-rated bonds to 24 basis points, or 22 percent of yield spreads, for BBB-rated bonds. 16 An alternative approach is to treat a bond with different ratings as different bonds. The results are similar to what we report here. The choice of three months is ad hoc. But the results with more restricted sampling such as by removing bonds that appear in less than up to 12 months are similar. The results without such restriction at all are also similar except for BB-rated bonds. Even so, they are still notably larger than those in Longstaff et al. (2005) , which, in contrast, found that nondefault components are insignificant for AAA/AA-rated bonds and decrease with worse rating (in particular, only 6 percent for BBB-rated bonds). Third, the nondefault components are statistically insignificantly different from zero for all but B-rated speculative-grade bonds. Notably, except for BB-rated bonds, these nondefault components are all negative. Fourth, for all investment-grade bonds together, the nondefault component averages 12 basis points and accounts for about 20 percent of yield spreads, while for speculative-grade bonds, the nondefault component is not significantly different from zero.
Columns (5)- (8) repeat the same exercises with Treasury-rate as the risk free rate measure. The results contrast to those with swap rate in several aspects. First, the nondefault components, both in basis points and as a fraction of yield spreads are statistically significantly different from zero for all investment-grade rating categories and, as a fraction of yield spreads, decrease with worse ratings. In particular, the nondefault components account for more than half of yield spreads for A-or better-rated bonds, and just over 40 percent of yield spreads for BBB-rated bonds. This contrasts to the result in Longstaff et al. (2005) , which found that the nondefault components are less than half of yield spreads for all investmentgrade bonds when using Treasury rate as the risk free rate. Second, the nondefault components are statistically significant for BB-rated bonds, accounting for 17 percent of yield spreads, but insignificant for other speculative-grade bonds. The results for BB-rated bonds are close to those found in Huang and
Huang (2003) and Longstaff et al. (2005) . Third, for all investment-grade bonds together, the nondefault component accounts for nearly half of spreads; while for speculative-grade bonds, the nondefault component is less than 10 percent of yield spreads. Both averages are statistically different from zero.
It is interesting to note that the choice of different risk free rate does not have much impact on the default component estimates (i.e., Columns (2) and (6)). That is, the different patterns of the nondefault components with alternative risk free rates reflect mostly the differences in yield spreads due to the factors causing the divergence between Treasury and swap rates, such as Treasury specialness and tax benefits. To the extent that these factors do not vary with corporate bond ratings, their effects account for a bigger part of yield spreads for higher-rated investment-grade bonds because their yield spreads are already low.
After having examined the means, Figure 1 plots by bond rating the histograms of the average nondefault component with swap rate as the risk free rate measure. We group all speculative-grade bonds except the CC-rated bond into a single category and don't show AAA-rated bonds due to their small sample sizes.
A striking pattern of these histograms is that for each rating category, the density of the the nondefault component all peaks at nearly zero basis point. In addition, while the distributions are fairly narrow for AAand A-rated bonds with right skewness, they are rather flat and fat-tailed for BBB-rated and, especially, speculative-grade bonds. 
Discussions
The above examinations of our estimated nondefault component of bond yield spreads raise a few research questions. First, the large variation in the estimated nondefault component, in both cross section and time series, beg for answers to what economic forces drive the nondefault component. In particular, we want to know to what extent the variation in the nondefault component are attributable to the crosssectional or the stochastic variation in corporate bond liquidity. Second, there may be violations of the underlying assumptions in using CDS term structure to estimate the default component. Notably, the negative nondefault component we observed in both cross section and time series suggests that the CDS market may not be entirely liquid (Tang and Yan, 2007; Fulop and Lescourret, 2007) or that corporate bond and CDS markets don't react to credit news in a synchronized fashion (Blanco, Brennan and Marsh, 2005; Zhu, 2006) . 18 Below we discuss these issues further and develop an empirical strategy to mitigate their impacts on our analysis.
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Time series plots of the mean values of the monthly nondefault component are similar to those of the median values for all but speculative-grade bonds. Due to their small numbers, the mean values for speculative-grade bonds exhibit even more volatilities in the early part of the studying period.
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Counterparty credit risk in CDS may also bias our estimations of the default component. The effect of counterparty credit risk on CDS pricing is believed to be small during usual times because only highly-rated agents are able to sell default protections and margin requirements are imposed for the issues. Other factors, such as cheap-to-deliver option in CDS contracts, may also affect CDS-based estimates of the default component (see, e.g., Calamaro et al., 2008) . Assessing the importance of many of these factors is important especially in light of current financial turmoil, and we leave this for future research. 
Effects of Liquidity on the Nondefault Component of Yield Spreads
We now report regression results on the effects of bond liquidity on the nondefault component of yield spreads. First, we demonstrate the importance of controlling for unobservable firm heterogeneity in identifying the liquidity effect. Second, we show that controlling for CDS liquidity and bond market informational efficiency increases significantly both the model fit and the economic significance of liquidity effects. Finally, we present a number of exercises that check for the robustness of our results. These exercises include (1) mitigating CDS liquidity issues by restricting our sample to only bonds issued by firms included in CDX indexes; (2) including bond characteristics as additional liquidity proxies; (3) explicitly controlling for macroeconomic conditions; (4) mitigating the impacts of news on our transactionbased liquidity measures by estimating our measures using trades outside major news hours; (5) using
Treasury rate as the risk free rate measure in estimating the nondefault component; and (6) using nondefault component estimated without correcting coupon effects.
Note that, unless specified otherwise, the risk free rate used in the nondefault component estimation is swap rate. In addition, to reduce the impact of outliers, we windsorize the sample at 5 percent of both the nondefault component and liquidity measures used in each regression. We also use log scale for our liquidity measures in all regressions. 
Controlling for Unobservable Firm Heterogeneity
We first use each of our three transaction-based liquidity measures individually, and then all three measures together. The time fixed effects control for macroeconomic conditions. Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are computed using the Huber/White robust method assuming that regression residual terms may be correlated across bonds issued by the same firm but uncorrelated across firms.
The results lend some support for the liquidity effect. Specifically, consistent with the common view, the coefficients on turnover rates are all negative, and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level for six out of eight regressions. The coefficients on the Amihud illiquidity measure and bid-ask spread are positive for only AA-and A-rated bonds and statistical significance in only some regressions (Columns 1 and 4 for the Amihud measure, Columns 2 and 6 for bid-ask spread). However, the 
With the fixed-effects model, we now effectively identify the liquidity effect using the variation across bonds issued by the same firm. The richness of our data, especially the full term structure of CDS spreads allowing for multiple bonds by the same firm, gives us enough degrees of freedom to estimate these fixed-effects models.
As shown in Table 7 , overall, controlling for the unobservable firm heterogeneity leads to stronger support for the liquidity effect on the nondefault component, especially for investment-grade bonds. Specifically, comparing to Table 6 , the main change is that the coefficients on the Amihud illiquidity and bid-ask spread measures become positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level for AA-and Arated bonds. In addition, results on turnover rate now show significant liquidity effects in all regressions.
But the signs of the coefficients on the Amihud illiquidity and bid-ask spread measures remain mostly negative for both BBB-rated and speculative-grade bonds and even become statistically significant.
Controlling for CDS Liquidity and Bond Market Informational Efficiency
The reliability of using CDS spreads to estimate the default component of yield spreads depends on two critical assumptions. First, CDS spreads reflect solely credit risk and the associated risk premium. This assumption may be violated if CDS market is not perfectly liquid. While the CDS market may be more liquid than the cash market, partly due to the absence of short-sale constraints and its unfunded nature (Hull et al., 2004; Longstaff et al., 2005) its liquidity may have been varying over time and across firms.
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Indeed, some recent studies suggest that the effect of CDS illiquidity on CDS spreads may be positive and statistically significant (Tang and Yan, 2007; Fulop and Lescourret, 2007 To address the above issues, we add two CDS variables to (2) to control for CDS liquidity and the difference in the informational efficiency between the bond and CDS markets: First, in the absence of direct CDS liquidity measures, e.g., CDS bid-ask spreads, we use the number of quotes on 5-year CDS contracts to control for the CDS liquidity effect. Presumably, a larger number of quotes indicates more dealers making the market, thus improving the CDS liquidity. Thus, our discussion above implies the coefficient on the number of quotes is expected to be positive. Second, instead of trying to measure directly the difference in the informational efficiency between the two markets, we include the one-period lagged CDS spread as a measure for the issuer's credit condition to control directly for the potential bias.
This variable is read at the corresponding bond's maturity from the CDS term structure fitted using the PCHIP algorithm described above. Our discussions above suggest that all else equal, the coefficients on the lagged CDS spread are expected to be negative. We call these two variables as CDS liquidity proxies, and our models become The results with these two additional controls are shown in Table 8 . Overall, controlling for CDS liquidity results in firmer support for the liquidity effect -in terms of coefficient signs, statistical significance, and model fit -especially for investment-grade bonds. First, all coefficients on the liquidity measures for BBBrated bonds now have expected signs and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
Second, except for AA-rated bonds, all coefficients on the lagged CDS spread are negative as expected and mostly statistically significant. This suggests that all else equal, the nondefault component of yield spreads increases with the improvement in the issuer's credit quality, consistent with the less informational efficiency in the bond markets. Third, except for AA-rated bonds, all coefficients of the number of CDS quotes are positive as expected but only statistically significant for the A-rated and some BBB-rated regressions, generally consistent with the existence of CDS illiquidity. Fourth, notably, the 2 R statistics increase significantly across all specifications but most dramatically for the speculative-grade bonds.
To examine the economic magnitude of the liquidity effect, we use the point estimates in Table 8 to calculate how the nondefault components change when each of the liquidity measures changes from its 25th to 75th percentile. We only report those estimates being statistically significant. The results are stated in Table 9 . Overall, in basis points, turnover rate has the largest impact, ranging from -1.5 to -2.8 basis points; bid-ask spread comes the second, about 1 to 2 bps; and the Amihud measure is slightly smaller, about 0.5 to 1.5 bps. Relative to the median yield spreads for our overall samples, the liquidity effects range from 1.5 to 6 percent (in absolute values). In addition, relative to total yield spreads, the liquidity effects decrease in rating -the strongest for AA-rated bonds and the weakest for BBB-rated bonds. Specifically, when the liquidity measures deteriorate by the magnitude of their interquartile ranges, the increase in the nondefault component can be as high as 6 percent of total yield spreads for AA-rated bonds, 4 percent for A-rated bonds, and 3 percent for BBB-rated bonds. These results suggest that the liquidity effects appear to be quantitatively moderate but nontrivial both relative to the near-zero nondefault components and even to their full yield spreads.
Robustness Analysis
Sample with CDX Members Only
To further mitigate the possible impact of CDS market liquidity on our estimations of nondefault component, we now examine the set of firms that are members of the CDX indexes at the time of trading.
The CDS contracts of these firms are likely more liquid than other contracts because of more exposures and more trades by the index arbitrage activities. While this does not guarantee to eliminate the issue of CDS liquidity creeping into our estimation of the nondefault component, it mitigates its impact on the cross-sectional effect of bond liquidity on the nondefault component. Table 10 reports the regression results with CDX members. The restriction greatly reduces the sample sizes, leaving too few observations for AA rated bonds. For A-rated bonds, the coefficients on all of our liquidity measures become statistically insignificant, albeit having the same signs as those in magnitudes are also similar to those in Table 8 . Results for high-yield bonds are largely unchanged.
Therefore, to the extent that CDX member names have more liquid CDS contracts, we find that the nondefault component of BBB-rated bonds is clearly associated with their bond liquidity. 
Controlling for Bond Characteristics as Liquidity Proxies
We now examine the significance of our transaction-based liquidity measures after controlling for conventional liquidity proxies. The results are shown in Table 11 . Comparing to our benchmark results in Table 8 , the point estimates on our transaction-based liquidity measures become somewhat smaller in absolute values, but their statistical significances remain largely unchanged (except column 2). These changes are consistent with the moderate correlations we find above between the transaction-based liquidity measures and bond characteristics. Coefficients on the number of CDS quotes and lagged CDS spreads are largely unchanged. These findings suggest that our transaction-based liquidity measures identify a unique portion of the variation in the nondefault component that is orthogonal to the conventional liquidity proxies.
As for the liquidity proxies, the nondefault components are positively associated with coupon rate but uncorrelated with bond size for all rating groups. Interpreting these coefficients is difficult since both coupon rate and bond size may be correlated with the issuer's credit risk. Nondefault components are also statistically significantly related to bond age and remaining maturity. Regarding bond age, for investment-grade bonds, nondefault components are marginally lower for younger bonds; but for speculative-grade bonds nondefault components first decrease as bonds get older within four years of issuance but then increase in age. Regarding remaining maturity, for investment-grade bonds, nondefault components are higher for remaining maturity less than two years and then are roughly flat for longer maturities; but for speculative-grade bonds, nondefault components decrease more precipitously in remaining maturity. Our findings on remaining maturity are consistent with previous studies suggesting that a large fraction of investment-grade bond yield spreads, especially at the short end of the maturity range, cannot be accounted for by credit risk (e.g., Huang and Huang, 2003) .
It is worth pointing out that some of our results are opposite to what have been found in the literature, for example, Longstaff et al. (2005) found nondefault components were found to be negatively related to bond size and positively with remaining maturity. Besides that our sample is much more representative, another possible reason for these differences may be due to our control for unobservable firm heterogeneity. In particular, previous studies may have picked up the correlation between bond characteristics and nondefault components effectively by comparing, say, large or long-term bonds issued by one firm to, respectively, small or short-term bonds issued by another firm. If credit quality and 19 BBB-rated CDS may be generally more liquid than other contracts in part due to the greater tendency of the market participants to use them to construct synthetic CDOs. The assets in the synthetic CDOs are generally required to have investment-grade rates, and BBB-rated CDS are those meeting that requirement with the highest cash flows. unobservable firm heterogeneity are not well controlled for, those findings may just reflect the correlation between bond size or maturity and credit risk.
Explicitly Controlling for Macroeconomic Conditions
While using time dummy variables may control for macroeconomic conditions, their coefficients may not be easily interpreted. To get a sense how the nondefault component is associated with macroeconomic conditions, we replace the time dummies with the following commonly-used macroeconomic variables as explicit controls: 6-month T-bill rate and term spread between 10-year Treasury rate and 6-month T-bill rate; monthly returns and implied volatilities on the S&P 500 index; and the on-the-run spread for 10-year The results are shown in Table 12. Comparing to Table 11 , the results on our transaction-based liquidity measures are largely unchanged (with somewhat lower significance level), so are those on CDS liquidity proxies and bond characteristics (not shown). On the macroeconomic variables, nondefault components are negatively associated with short rate and term spread. Since Treasury term structures often increase on stronger outlook for economic growth, this result suggests that nondefault components decrease on better economic perspectives. This is consistent with the negative correlation between nondefault components and S&P 500 stock returns (when they are statistically significant). Finally, nondefault components are found to increase in S&P implied volatility for only high-yield bonds. Results on 10-year Treasury on-the-run premium -a proxy for Treasury market liquidity -are only positively significant for AA and A-rated bonds, as they may be closer substitutes for Treasury securities.
Using Liquidity Measures Estimated from "Non-News-Driven" Trades
Since transaction price, trade size, and trading frequency may be affected by both bond liquidity and valuations, changes in our transaction-based liquidity measures may also reflect changes in firm fundamentals, especially when news arrives. To mitigate the potential impact of news, we now use only transactions occurring between 10:30AM and 3:30PM each day to exclude possibly news-driven trades.
We choose this time window because company news usually arrives in the after-market hours and major economic data are generally released no later than 10AM. Note that restricting the trade window not only drops a set of bonds and firms from our sample but also changes the values of the liquidity measures for the bonds remaining in the sample. Thus, any changes in our regression results reflect the effects of both factors.
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The results, shown in Table 13 , suggest that excluding news-driven trades in general leads to more moderate liquidity effects. Comparing to Table 11 , the results on A-rated bonds are roughly unchanged.
But for AA-and BBB-rated bonds, most coefficients become statistically insignificant, although they continue to have the expected signs. Coefficients for speculative-grade bonds remain statistically insignificant. To the extent that bond liquidity may vary when news arrives, the above results also suggest that news helps to identify the dynamic liquidity effect on the nondefault component of yield spreads.
Treasury Rate as Risk Free Rate
Swap rate has been regarded as the appropriate risk free rate for studying the effects of liquidity on the nondefault component, as it offers a better control for tax effects and is arguably closer to dealers' funding cost. Nonetheless, as mentioned early, using swap rate has its own drawbacks. For example, swap rate may have a component compensating for counterparty default risks, and the benchmark LIBOR rate also has a credit risk component. For robustness, we follow the literature to repeat our regressions with the nondefault component estimated using Treasury rate as the risk free rate.
The results are shown in Table 14. Comparing to Table 11 , the results are roughly unchanged for both investment-grade and speculative-grade bonds. These suggest that the difference in the estimated nondefault components resulting from using alternative risk free rates is largely uncorrelated with our transaction-based liquidity measures.
Among other regressors, notable changes occur to the coefficients on coupon rate: They become slightly smaller for investment-grade bonds but slightly larger for speculative-grade bonds. On a related note, Longstaff et al. (2005) argued that one can use the difference in the estimated coefficients on coupon rate between using Treasury rate and using swap rate as an estimate for the tax effect on corporate bond yield spread. Based on our estimates, this would result in a negative tax effect for investment-grade bonds but a positive tax effect for speculative-grade bonds! Our results thus suggest that their method of identifying tax effect at best may not be robust to the controlling for transaction-based liquidity effect or for unobservable firm heterogeneity. Clearly, more research questions remain regarding the tax effect.
No Correction for Coupon Effects
We have argued that we improve the estimation of the nondefault component of yield spreads by fully correcting coupon effect. What happens if we don't adjust for coupon effect? We reestimate our models with the nondefault component equal to bond spreads minus the CDS spread that is read directly at the comparable maturity from the CDS term structure (i.e., Line 3 in Table 2 ).
The results with swap rate as the risk free rate are shown in orthogonal to our transaction-based liquidity measures, although they may affect the estimated levels of the nondefault component.
Not surprisingly, failing to adjust the coupon effect has significant impacts on the coefficients on coupon rates. Indeed, for investment-grade bonds they decrease by about 0.4 on average, implying that all else equal, for each percentage of coupon rate, one would underestimate the nondefault component by 0.4 basis points if the coupon effects were not removed. The impact for speculative-grade bonds is more modest.
Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the nondefault component of corporate bond yield spreads and examine its relationship with bond liquidity. We construct three types of bond liquidity measures, including price impact of trades, transaction costs, and trading frequency variables, using newly available intraday transactions data. In addition, we control for the default component of bond spreads using the term structure of CDS spreads, addressing both maturity mismatch and coupon effect that may have biased existing estimations. Importantly, in doing so, our methodology allows us to have enough degrees of freedom to use fixed-effects models to control for the unobservable firm heterogeneity that may otherwise bias the regression analysis.
Using swap rate as the risk free rate, the estimated nondefault component of yield spread is in general moderate and statistically significant for only AA-, A-, and BBB-rated bonds and increasing in this order both in basis points and as a fraction of yield spreads. With Treasury rate as the risk free rate, the estimated nondefault component is statistically significant for all investment-grade bonds (i.e., those rated AAA, AA, A, and BBB) and BB-rated bonds. In basis points, the nondefault component is the largest for BBB-rated bonds; but as a fraction of yield spreads, the nondefault component is decreasing in bond rating, that is, the highest for AAA-rated bonds. In addition, the nondefault component accounts more than half of yield spreads for A-and higher-rated bonds.
We find a positive and significant relationship between the nondefault component and bond illiquidity for investment-grade bonds (i.e., those rated AA, A, and BBB) but no significant relationship for speculativegrade bonds. We demonstrate that such estimated relationship would appear weaker if the unobservable firm heterogeneity were not well controlled for. We also find that the nondefault component of bond spreads comoves with indicators for macroeconomic conditions, particularly, negatively with the Treasury term structure. In addition, controlling for conventional liquidity proxies does not affect the statistical significance of our transaction-based liquidity measures, suggesting our liquidity measures identify a unique portion of the nondefault component associated with the stochastic variation in bond liquidity.
Finally, the estimated effects of our transaction-based liquidity measures are robust to a number of alternative model specifications and samplings, such as excluding news-driven trades and using Treasury rate as the risk free rate.
For future research, the strong statistical evidence of the positive relationship between the nondefault component of yield spreads and bond illiquidity suggests that it is important to incorporate liquidity factors into the bond pricing models. In addition, our results call for careful reevaluations on the effects of CDS market liquidity and tax on corporate yield spreads. have sink fund features. In addition, to include a reference entity, we require its CDS quotes be nonmissing at 1-and 10-year maturities and non-missing at additional two of the four maturities in between (i.e., 2-, 3-, 5-, and 7-year).
We merge this overall sample with the TRACE data to obtain our regression sample. The sampling period The total number of unique bonds or firms is not equal to the sum over all rating categories because a bond may appear in more than one rating group due to rating changes. (3) and (7), and in fraction in Columns in (4) and (8) 
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